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Equal Pay in the European Community:
Practical and Philosophical Goals
Sara P. Crovitzt
The European Community ("EC") was established to promote
free trade and a free labor market among its Member States and to
create a unified economic and social policy.1 At the 'time of its inception, some Community founders feared that variances in national laws might place those Member States with equal pay laws
at a competitive disadvantage. Industries in Member States without equal pay laws might take advantage of that fact by paying
women less than comparably employed men. To correct for such
disparities and ensure fair competition, the Community's founders
included Article 119 in the Treaty of Rome. This Article guarantees to both men and women equal pay for equal work.2
In the last 34 years, however, women have achieved neither
equal pay for the same work, nor equal pay for work of equivalent
value, despite enactment of subsequent Community legislation attempting to define, enforce, and extend the requirements of Article
119.1 At the very least, women will not achieve pay equality by
December 1992, the date set for complete economic unification, unless major revisions are made to the wording and enforcement of
Community law. In order to ensure free competition and gender
equality within the common market, the EC should amend Community law to allocate burdens of proof in discrimination claims
more equitably, to eliminate discriminatory standards, and to supplement the inadequate remedies currently available to victims of
both direct and indirect pay discrimination.
This Comment focuses on these aspects of EC law and suggests alternative ways to structure equal pay and discrimination
remedies. Part I describes the history and development of equality
legislation and the case law interpreting Article 119. Part II discusses substantive problems with current legal remedies, specifi-

t B.A. 1989, University of Chicago; J.D. Candidate 1993, University of Chicago.
Treaty Est the Eur Eco Comm, Preamble.
2 EEC, Art 119.
' See Council Dir 75/117, 1975 OJ L45:19; Council Dir 76/207, 1976 OJ L39:40; and
Council Dir 79/7, 1979 OJ L6:24.
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cally addressing plaintiffs' heavy burdens of proof, discriminatory
Community legal standards, and the inadequate relief provisions
enacted under Community law. Part III proposes some reform
measures to redress the problems identified in part II. It concludes
by suggesting that further Community legislation may be necessary
in order to reconcile the goals of free competition and equal pay in
employment.
I.
A.

COMMUNITY EQUAL

Article 119 and the
Directives

PAY

LEGISLATION AND CASE LAW

Equal Pay and Equal

Treatment

A concern for promoting free competition among its members
animated the founders of the Community.4 More particularly,
'"[Article 119] was adopted purely and simply out of the fear that
if women workers were underpaid, national industries would suffer
a negative effect as regards their competitive position." The language of the equal pay provision thus reinforces the economic focus of the Article, and it is silent with respect to issues of social
justice and equality. Indeed, Article 119 requires only that "men
and women should receive equal pay for equal work."'

Christopher McCrudden, Comparable Worth: A Common Dilemma, 11 Yale J Intl L
396, 398 (1986).
' H. Vredling, Speech at the EEC/EOC Conference on Equality for Women,
Manchester, May 28-30, 1980, excerpted in Katherine O'Donovan and Erika Szyszczak,
Equality and Sex Discrimination Law 12 (Basil Blackwell, 1988).
During the drafting of the Community charter, France was worried that it would be at a
competitive disadvantage because it already had equal pay laws in place. As a result, Germany acceded to French demands to include an equal pay provision in the founding Treaty.
However, Germany conditioned its accedence on the express understanding that the Article
would not be directly applicable-that is, it would not, in the absence of national implementing legislation, give individuals rights that they could enforce against the state-and
that it would not displace the provisions of the German Constitution that already addressed
equal pay issues. See Catherine Hoskyns, Give Us Equal Pay and We'll Open Our Own
Doors-A Study of the Impact in the Federal Republic of Germany and the Republic of
Ireland of the European Community's Policy on Women's Rights, in Mary Buckley and
Malcolm Anderson, eds, Women, Equality and Europe 38, 78 (MacMillan Press, 1988).
' EEC, Art 119. The founders apparently settled on this language because Member
States were unwilling to incorporate the broader phraseology of "equal pay for work of
equal value," proposed by the International Labor Organization ("ILO"). See McCrudden,
11 Yale J Intl L at 399 (cited in note 4). Significantly, the ILO language would have allowed
wider comparisons between jobs. Women would not have to compare themselves only to
men doing the same job in the same place of work, but they could also compare themselves
to men doing broadly similar work in an establishment run by the same employer.
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Although the Commission required implementation of equal
7
pay laws by 1961, the Community did not adhere to this schedule.
The Member States set up a new timetable to eliminate wage discrimination by the end of 1964, and they agreed, in a resolution,
"that the progressive implementation of the principle of equal remuneration for men and women workers is intended to abolish all
discrimination in the fixing of wages[.]" ' However, the Member
States also failed to adhere to this timetable. Moreover, in the
early 1970s, the European Court of Justice ("ECJ") also demonstrated its reluctance to aggressively implement Article 119.1
As a result, the Commission submitted a proposal to the
Council suggesting further development of Article 119's principle
of equal pay, and the Council passed this proposal as a directive in
1975.0 This directive, the Equal Pay Directive ("EPD"), sought to
clarify Member State obligations under Article 119. Indeed, the
Directive reintroduced language that the Community had previously discarded," and it defined "equal pay for equal work" as
[equal pay] for the same work or for work to which equal
value is attributed. . . . In particular, where a job classification system is used for determining pay, it must be
based on the same criteria for both men and women and
so drawn up as to exclude any discrimination on grounds
of sex. 2
The Council also passed an Equal Treatment Directive
("ETD") that required Member States to eliminate discrimination
in all aspects of hiring, employment, and retirement. 13 Under the
ETD, employers could exclude women from only those jobs where
"by reason of their nature or the context in which they are carried

' Recommendations by the Commission to the Member States relating to Article 119 of
the Treaty, Bull EEC (Aug/Sept 1960), cited in McCrudden, 11 Yale J Intl L at 399 (cited
in note 4).
' Equal Remuneration for Equal Work as Between Men and Women, Bull EEC (Jan
1962), quoted in McCrudden, 11 Yale J Intl L at 400 (cited in note 4).
' See Case 43/75, Delrenne v Soci~t6 Anonyme Beige de Navigation Akrienne Sabena,
1976 ECR 455, 1976:2 CMLR 98.
'0 Council Dir 75/117, 1975 OJ at L45:19 (cited in note 3).
" See note 6.
12 Council Dir 75/117, 1975 OJ at L45:19 (cited in note 3). The EPD also requires Member States to introduce measures designed to give employees a means of enforcement in the
courts as well as requiring Member States to oversee collective agreements to ensure equal
pay.
'" Council Dir 76/207, 1976 OJ at L39:40 (cited in note 3).
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out, the sex of the worker constitutes a determining factor."14 Further, the ETD applies to both direct and indirect discrimination:
[T]he principle of equal treatment shall mean that there
shall be no discrimination whatsoever on grounds of sex
either directly or indirectly by reference in particular to
marital or family status.1 5
Thus, the ETD expressly prohibits direct discrimination, such
as an employer advertising a job using language referring exclusively to men. It also expressly prohibits indirect discrimination,
such as when employers use facially neutral practices that have a
disparate impact on women. ' The EPD, in contrast, does not explicitly apply to indirect discrimination. Consequently, not all
Member States have allowed plaintiffs to base their equal pay
claims on indirect discrimination.
B.

A Legacy of Failed Implementation

Despite Community efforts, the EPD and ETD have not ensured equal pay or equal treatment in all Member States. In fact,
in 1979 the Commission had to institute (pursuant to Article 169
of the EEC Treaty) proceedings against several Member States for
failures to conform national law to the requirements of Article 119,

Id, art 2. Predictably, national courts have been unable to agree on the proper interpretation of this provision of the ETD. For example, Italy has interpreted it narrowly, allowing employers to exclude women only from those jobs limited to one gender for artistic
or fashion reasons. Conversely, Belgium has interpreted the provision more broadly, permitting employers to exclude women from such diverse occupations as acting, modeling, prison
administration and physical education instruction. See Ferdinand von Prondzynski, Implementation of the Equality Directives 30 (Commission of the European Communities, 1987).
" Council Dir 76/207, art 2, 1976 OJ at L39:40 (cited in note 3).
"6Indirect discrimination occurs when a facially neutral requirement has an evident,
disparate impact on a woman's pay-either by lowering her wages or by excluding her from
jobs entirely.
For example, part-time employees who perform the same tasks as full-time employees
often receive lower wages. Since women account for most of the part-time labor force, they
are disproportionately disadvantaged by the lower wages. See Isabelle Prondzynski, Women
in Statistics 72 (Commission of the European Communities, 1989) (although the numbers
vary across the Community, females make up about 77% of part-time workers).
Moreover, some nations permit employers to indirectly discriminate against women by
conditioning the receipt of benefits on the attainment of a certain level of seniority. Since
women tend to enter the work force later than men, or have interrupted service due to
childcare responsibilities, they are often not eligible for these benefits. Other women face
exclusion from some jobs due to height or weight requirements that bear only indirectly-if
at all-on one's ability to perform required tasks. See Ferdinand von Prondzynski, Implementation of the Equality Directives at 17-18 (discussing Italian employment practices)
(cited in note 14).
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the EPD, and the ETD. 17 These proceedings demonstrated how
Member States have attempted to bypass equal pay legislation in
order to gain an economic advantage.'
Although Commission victories in these proceedings required
the losing Member States to enact new equal pay legislation, such
results have not meaningfully reduced the incidence of pay discrimination in the Community. Recent reports indicate that in jobs
where men and women perform the same tasks, disparities in pay
of up to 23 percent remain.' 9 While most Member States have narrowed the wage gap between men and women, such reports also
prove that women's wages have recently levelled off.2"
The reports also found that women were more likely to be unemployed than their male counterparts. Thus, while male unemployment in the European Community fell from 9.5 to 8.1 percent
during the period from 1984 to 1988, female unemployment remained relatively steady at 12.9 percent.21 Moreover, such reports
do not take into account the pay disparities caused by the disproportionate number of women who occupy low paying positions. For
example, in 1982, sixty percent of all female manual workers were
employed in catering, cleaning, hairdressing, or other, traditionally
low-paying, service occupations.22

McCrudden, 11 Yale J Intl L at 406-07 (cited in note 4). For example, the Commission brought and won cases before the ECJ against Luxembourg, Denmark, and the United
Kingdom. See, respectively, Case 58/81, Commission v Luxembourg, 1982 ECR 2175, 1982:3
CMLR 482; Case 143/8, Commission v Kingdom of Denmark, 1985 ECR 427, 1986:1 CMLR
44; Case 61/81, Commission v United Kingdom, 1982 ECR 2601, 1982:3 CMLR 284.
" For example, the Commission based its case against Denmark on the definition of
"same work" in Danish law, which the Danish government claimed had wider application
than the Commission gave it. Danish law implementing the directive stated that the principle of equal pay applied only to "the same work" and not to work of equal value. While the
Danish government claimed that the principle of equal pay was already implemented in
collective agreements, the ECJ held that unequivocal wording was necessary to give all
workers a clear and precise understanding of their rights and obligations. Having a right is
only helpful if workers know about and can enforce it. Further, without clear language in
the national law, the ECJ doubted that Danish workers could effectively ascertain and vindicate their rights. See Case 143/83, Commission v Kingdom of Denmark, 1985 ECR 427,
435, 1986:1 CMLR 44.
19 Linda Jackson, UK Women 'Paid 23% less than Men,' Press Association Newsfile
(Sept 25, 1991).
2Q Isabelle Prondzynski, Women in Statistics at 62 (cited in note 16).
" Id at 85.
22 Equal Opportunity Commission, Seventh Annual Report (1982), in Evelyn Ellis, Sex
Discrimination Law 60 n 75 (Gower Publishing Co., 1988).

THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LEGAL FORUM

482

II.

SUBSTANTIVE

PROBLEMS WITH EXISTING

EC

[1992:

LAW

Article 119 and existing Community equality legislation do not
contain express standards by which to evaluate Member State adherence to equal pay provisions. Because of the nature of EC directives, Member States must devise their own legal procedures and
remedies for victims of pay discrimination. 2 These national systems vary in their effectiveness. However, all share common
problems that impede free competition by allowing some Member
States to pay women less for their work. These problems include
heavy burdens of proof for plaintiffs, legal standards that are
themselves discriminatory, and the inadequate relief afforded to
successful plaintiffs.
A.

Heavy Burdens of Proof

1. Direct discrimination claims.
A woman who seeks to bring an equal pay claim based on direct discriminationmust prove that she has been paid less than a
man working in a comparable job, and that she was paid less because she was a woman.2 4 Several problems arise for a woman trying to prove such claims.
First, she must find a "comparator," a man employed in a similarly-valued job. 5 The EPD's language does not define the term
"comparator" for equal pay purposes. It only states that equal pay
shall be required for "the same work or for work to which equal
value is attributed."2 6 Broadly understood, this language could allow a court to designate as a comparator any male who is or was
doing work of the same value in any industry located in the
Community. 27

23

See Comment, Directives and the Doctrine of Direct Effect: A Critique of Marshall v

Southampton Area Health Authority, 1992 U Chi Legal F 315 (discussing unique features of
Community directives).
2 See McCrudden, 11 Yale J Intl L at 396 (cited in note 4).
2" In American law, the term usually used is "comparable."
26 Council Dir 75/117, art 1, 1975 OJ at L45:19 (cited in note 3).
27 For example, if an independent assessor assigned point values to the various occupations in the Community, a woman who held a job valued at X points would be entitled to
use as a comparator any male in the Community who held a similarly-valued job-even if
the comparator was employed in a different industry.
Some Member States currently employ such independent assessors. Thus, independent
assessors may be provided by court order or may be part of national legislation. Their job is
to provide an objective view of the value of the jobs that are being compared. However, their
objectivity has not always been above reproach. See Part II B, below.
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However, at present, only Italy has interpreted the EPD to allow the use of such cross-industry comparators.2 8 Most other Member States have interpreted the EPD's language more narrowly.
For example, some national laws have allowed comparisons only
between people doing similar work for the same employer, or at
best between people working in different companies that are controlled by the same third party.2 9 Others have even refused to compare women and men that perform the same jobs in the same
30
city.
These comparator identification problems have also encouraged businesses to keep women segregated. If women are segregated, potential plaintiffs may be unable to find an appropriate
comparator, and thus they may be discouraged from pursuing their
pay discrimination claims. Yet, despite its gravity, this problem
has received adequate attention in only one Member State-the
Netherlands.
Dutch law allows women to compare themselves to a hypothetical comparator:
[W]here no work of equal or approximately equal value is
done by a worker of the other sex in the undertaking
where the worker concerned is employed, the basis shall
be the wage that a worker of the other sex normally receives, in an undertaking of as nearly as possible the
same kind in the same section [of industry]. 1
However, because other Member States have been unwilling to define "comparators" as broadly, Dutch equal pay law may place that
nation's industries at a competitive disadvantage. Dutch women
will thus find it easier to bring their pay discrimination claims, but
in so doing they will expose Dutch industries to greater liability.
This increased exposure may in turn drive Dutch industries to
relocate to other Member States with less vigorous equal pay laws,
effectively nullifying any equal pay gains: Women would have
28 Ferdinand von Prondzynski, Implementation of the Equality Directives at 24 (cited
in note 14).
29 For example, in the United Kingdom and Ireland, plaintiffs can only use comparators
that work in the same establishment. See McCrudden, 11 Yale J Intl L at 417-18 (cited in
note 4).
30 Id at 418-19.
3

Act to Lay Down Rules for the Entitlement of Workers to a Wage that is Equal to

the Wage Earned by Workers of the Other Sex for Work of Equal Value, 129 Staatsblad
voor het Koninkrijk der Nederlanden [Stb.] 1975 (Netherlands), cited in McCrudden, 11
Yale J Intl L at 407 (cited in note 4).
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gained rights to equal pay only at the cost of having fewer job
opportunities.3"
Second, even if a woman overcomes comparator identification
problems, the heavy burden of proof she must bear may still make
recovery impossible. For example, Germany requires a woman to
establish that a particular practice is discriminatory (that is, present her prima facie case) before it shifts the burden of proof to an
employer. 3 This may impose great hardships on plaintiffs because
employers generally have all of the relevant, objective evidence in
their possession. Under such laws, women are often left unable to
establish their prima facie case-even for the most egregious
violations.34
Third, even if a woman is successful in presenting her prima
facie case, many Member States' laws give employers a variety of
defenses that allow them to escape liability. 35 For example, the
United Kingdom, Ireland, and Germany have all passed laws that
allow employers to justify persistent wage disparities if they are
32 Of course, such an argument may prove too much in that it suggests that Community
industries will move elsewhere if Community laws expose them to too much liability and
reduce their competitiveness vis-a-vis the rest of the world. However, the gains realized
from trade within the Community would probably more than offset increased exposure to
liability in most instances. Moreover, relocating to other continents might be significantly
more costly and difficult for industries than relocating to elsewhere in Europe. Thus, until
the costs to the industry of increased exposure to liability exceed this continental threshold,
relocation would not be a viable option.
Additionally, such a one-dimensional approach oversimplifies the analysis in that industries consider a number of factors and costs in determining where to locate-only one of
which is the cost of legal liability. Yet, assuming that the EC at least seeks-if it has not
already attained-a common market in which there are no national barriers to the free
movement of capital, goods, or people, then operating costs should become roughly
equivalent in all countries. Hence, this relocation analysis proves most compelling when one
assumes that all other costs of operation are roughly equal across the Community-an assumption with scant support at present.
3 Ferdinand von Prondzynski, Implementation of the Equality Directives at 43 (cited
in note 14).
. Id. In this Commission report on the equality legislation, Prondzynski claims that in
a recent case in France, the plaintiff failed to establish her equal pay claim because the
employer had refused her access to the relevant information.
" Employers have also tried to defend discriminatory pay practices by claiming that
pay differentials must be evaluated in light of the total compensation package. Thus, if an
employer could show that a woman's aggregate benefits are the same as a man's, even
though the components of the package differ according to sex, then the employer should not
be liable. However, the ECJ has refused to recognize such a defense, ruling in Barber v
Guardian Royal Exchange Assurance that equal pay implies equality at every level of remuneration. Case C-262/88, 1990:2 CMLR 513. Moreover, if the defense was recognized,
courts would have to engage in complex factual analyses to determine if different benefits
packages were of equal value-duties they are ill-equipped to discharge. Id at 557.
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motivated by considerations other than gender.36 These laws favor
employers because their justifications are generally not strictly
scrutinized. In the past, for example, employers could avoid equal
pay liability simply by changing a woman's job description to
"light?' work. 7 Thus, jobs in which women were overrepresented
could be classified as "easier" jobs, regardless of their actual
requirements."8
2. Indirect discrimination claims.
Attempts to eradicate indirect discrimination may, for several
reasons, require more complex measures. First, indirect discrimination is more difficult for courts to identify than direct discrimination. Although an indirectly discriminatory practice affects one
group disproportionately, it may often appear gender neutral.
Second, EC legislation does not clearly define indirect discrimination. 3e As a result, some Member States, such as the United
Kingdom and Ireland, have attempted to define indirect discrimination in their national implementing statutes. These countries
look to see if the job description contains a requirement that is not
essential or justifiable and that disproportionately affects a particular gender or marital status group."0 However, under these statutes, the burden of proof rests with the plaintiff and can be extremely onerous. Thus, in some cases, courts have required women
to clearly establish the discriminatory effects of a particular practice through statistical evidence.41 Yet, because employers are not
required to furnish employees with the relevant documents in their
" Specifically, the United Kingdom's defense is based on a "genuine material factor
which is not the difference of sex." In Ireland, the defense is based on "grounds other than
sex," and in Germany, the defense is based on "material reasons unrelated to a particular
sex." See McCrudden, 11 Yale J Intl L at 420-21 (cited in note 4).
37 Tiziano Treu, Equal Pay and Comparable Worth: A View from Europe, 8 Comp Lab
L J 1, 5 (1986).
"SA recent study indicates that this practice of renaming jobs to avoid liability persists.
For example, in the city administration of Luxembourg, public sanitation employees are
classified into job titles that are male or female ("Strassenreiniger" and "Arbeiterin im
Reinigungsdienst"). Although both appear to do similar cleaning work, women are paid less.
See Ferdinand von Prondzynski, Implementation of the Equality Directives at 15 (cited in
note 14).
" Because indirect discrimination was not expressly mentioned in the EPD, women
must base such claims on the ETD. However, the ETD leaves national courts a great deal of
discretion to determine what practices constitute indirect discrimination. See text of ETD,
reproduced in text at note 15.
" O'Donovan & Szyszczak, Equality and Sex DiscriminationLaw at 114 (cited in note

5).

"' Ferdinand von Prondzynski, Implementation of the Equality Directives at 20 (cited
in note 14).
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possession, women may often find it impossible to establish such
effects.
However, in indirect discrimination cases, the ECJ has at least
been more willing to establish criteria by which to evaluate and
limit employer defenses.42 In Bilka-Kaufhaus GmbH v Weber von
Hartz, 3 the court ruled that in evaluating a claim for indirect discrimination, a national court must determine whether a particular
practice was based on objective grounds:
If the national court finds that the measures chosen by
[the employer] correspond to a real need on the part of
the undertaking, are appropriatewith a view to achieving the objectives pursued by the enterprise and are necessary to that end, the fact that the measures affect a far
greater number of women than men is not sufficient to
show that they constitute an infringement of Article
119.

44

These criteria-"real need," "appropriate," and "necessary to that
end"-thus place some limit on the defenses that an employer can
raise in defense of indirectly discriminatory practices. They require
more than just a plausible objective justification to uphold a particular practice.
B.

Discriminatory Standards

Women seeking to recover on unequal pay claims must also
overcome other obstacles. First, discriminatory standards are often
employed to select an appropriate comparator, which may result in
systematic undervaluation of women's work. Second, some MemHowever, the ECJ at first seemed to give broader scope to employer defenses in indirect discrimination suits. Thus, in Jenkins v Kingsgate (Clothing Productions) Ltd., the
ECJ held that an employer could pay a higher hourly wage to full-time employees based
simply on a good faith desire to hire people to work full-time. Case 96/80, 1981 ECR 911,
1981:2 CMLR 24. Hence, it approved the employer's practice of paying its predominantly
female, part-time employees less than its largely male, full-time employees, because the
"employer [was] endeavouring on economic grounds which may be objectively justified to
encourage full-time work irrespective of the sex of the worker." 1981 ECR at 925.
"3Case 170/84, 1986 ECR 1607, 1986:2 CMLR 701. In this case, the plaintiff claimed
that under Article 119, her 11.5 years of full-time and 3.5 years of part-time employment
should qualify her for a retirement pension. 1986 ECR at 1609, 1621. However, the employer
pension scheme required that one be employed full-time for at least fifteen years before
becoming eligible for the pension. The plaintiff thus contended that conditioning receipt of
the pension on her status as a full-time employee violated Article 119. Such a practice indirectly discriminated against women, who are more likely to work part-time than their male
counterparts.
11Id at 1628 (emphasis added).
42
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ber States have passed laws that give effect-intentionally or otherwise-to anachronistic and outdated stereotypes respecting
women's biological abilities to preform various jobs. This contributes to the undervaluation of women's work, and it may effectively
exclude them from certain professions altogether. Third, women
must overcome attitudinal barriers that continue to impede their
quest for equality.
1. Comparator and other valuation problems.
In order to compare different jobs and identify appropriate
comparators, most Member States use a point system. 5 Independent experts or commissions assess jobs and assign point values
based on factors such as responsibility, skill, physical and mental
requirements, and working conditions. 6 However, measuring job
value in this way may disadvantage working women in at least two
ways.
First, problems arise when a woman's job is valued more
highly in terms of demands, skill, and responsibility than a man's
job, but she nonetheless receives less pay."7 The ECJ has held that
in such circumstances, even though the woman's work was of
higher value, her work should be regarded as "like work" so that
she could get at least the same pay as the comparator received for
the lower-valued, higher-paid work. 8 The Court thus applied Article 119 to this situation to ensure that an employer could not "circumvent the principle [of equal pay] by assigning additional or
more onerous duties to workers of a particular sex, who could then
be paid a lower wage." '4 9
Second, content-based job valuations also suffer from a more
serious shortcoming that affects many valuation systems. Valuing
jobs according to traditional, "objective" factors discriminates
"' McCrudden, 11 Yale J Intl L at 411 (cited in note 4). In measuring what constitutes
work of equal value, the EC had several standards from which to choose: (1) the market
value of a job; (2) the marginal productivity or the value that the work adds to the enterprise's output; or (3) the job's content. The Member States have adopted the third approach, which prevents employers from paying women less by claiming that women are less
productive than men.
" Hayward v Cammell Laird Shipbuilders Ltd., 1984 Indus Rel L Rep 463 (Industrial
Tribunal), cited in McCrudden, 11 Yale J Intl L at 413 (cited in note 4).
4' Indeed, when faced with this problem, the Irish High Court doubted that a woman's
claim could succeed, since her work was not "like work." Case 157/86, Murphy v An Bord
Telecom Eireann, 1988 ECR 673, 1988:2 CMLR 879 (Irish High Court). The Irish High
Court's reluctance to apply Article 119 to this situation exemplifies Member State reluctance to implement equality legislation.
48 1988 ECR at 690.
49 Id.
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against women: if jobs are valued in terms of characteristics that
men possess in greater quantity than women, then employers may
often be justified in paying women less. For instance, if an assessor
values physical strength more highly than other, equally important
characteristics, then employers may legally pay stronger employees
(mostly males) more for their work than those who possess less
strength (mostly females), but also possess greater quantities of
other attributes, such as manual dexterity. Thus, stronger employees (mostly men) are better compensated, despite the fact that
their strength may not enable them to perform their tasks any better than weaker employees who possess greater skills in other areas
(mostly women).
At least one Member State, the United Kingdom, has
amended its Equal Pay Act of 1970 in an attempt to address such
problems.50 The amendment requires assessors to value jobs according to the following terms:
A woman is to be regarded as employed on work rated as
equivalent with that of any man if, but only if, her job
and their job have been given an equal value, in terms of
the demand made on a worker under various headings
(for instance, effort, skill, decision), on a study undertaken with a view to evaluating in those terms the jobs to
be done by all or any of the employees in an undertaking
or group of undertakings, or would have been given an
equal value but for the evaluation being made on a system setting different values for men and women on the
same demand under any heading.5 1
Such legislation, however, may not effectively remedy discriminatory valuation problems. Employment remains quite segregated
throughout the EC, which makes it nearly impossible to create a
job valuation system that does not favor one sex or the other.
Moreover, judicial reluctance to aggressively enforce such legislation may undermine its effectiveness. For example, in the United
Kingdom, courts require employers to justify advantages that a
particular valuation may give to one sex or the other. However,
"0However, an adverse decision by the ECJ was largely responsible for the U.K.'s decision to amend its equal pay laws. See Case 61/81, Commission of the European Communities v United Kingdom, 1982 ECR 2601; 1982:3 CMLR 284.
" Equal Pay Act of 1970 as amended, cited in Michael Rubenstein, DiscriminatoryJob
Evaluation and the Law, 7 Comp Labor L 172, 173-74 (1986).
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despite some initial promise,5 2 British courts have often undermined the effectiveness of this requirement by failing to hold employers to a strict standard. They have seldom required employers
to prove that a particular discriminatory practice is strictly necessary. Instead, in Ojutiku and Oburoni v Manpower Services Commission, a British court held that employers must only show that a
particular valuation that disadvantages women is "reasonably
needed," defining "reasonable" as that which would be acceptable
to "right-thinking people as sound and tolerable."5 In the EC
country with the greatest wage gap between men and women, 4 the
judgment of "right-thinking people" simply cannot be trusted.
The ECJ has also addressed the issue of discriminatory job
valuation schemes. Yet, its forays into this area have been equally
unsatisfying. For example, in Rummler v Dato-Druck Gmbh, 55 the
ECJ ruled that the compensation scheme at issue was not necessarily discriminatory simply because it accorded greater value to attributes (namely strength) that men more frequently possess than
women.5 6 However, in reaching its decision, the Court failed to examine other characteristics, such as manual dexterity, that might
be equally important to job performance. It simply assumed that
physical strength was appropriately valued in proportion to its effect on job performance; if manual dexterity were of equal importance, it would have been weighted more heavily in the initial assessment. Given the history of such discrimination, this approach

" Initially, however, British Courts suggested that they would hold employers to a
strict standard of necessity in terms of the justifications that they would accept for a discriminatory practice. For example, in Steel v Union of Post Office Workers, the court held
that:
[Ilt is right to distinguish between a requirement or condition which is necessary
and one which is merely convenient, and for this purpose it is relevant to consider
whether the employer can find some other and non-discriminatory method of
achieving his object.
1978 ICR 181, 1977 IRLR 288, cited in Rubenstein, 7 Comp Labor L at 188-89 (cited in note
51). In other words, the court adopted a strict necessity test, similar to the "business necessity" test adopted by American courts. See Griggs v Duke Power Company, 401 US 424
(1971).
" Ojutiku and Oburoni v Manpower Services Commission, 1982 IRLR 418, cited in
Rubenstein, 7 Comp Labor L at 188-89.
" The disparity in pay between men and women in the United Kingdom is eight to ten
percent higher than that of any other Member State, even though women make up a higher
proportion of its work force than all other Member States except Denmark. Jackson, Press
Association Newsfile (Sept 25, 1991) (cited in note 19).
"' Case 237/85, Rummler v Dato-Druck Gmbh, 1986 ECR 2101, 1987:3 CMLR 127. At
issue in this case was a woman's equal pay claim. Her job consisted of working with heavy
machines, adjusting smaller machines, and lifting paper stacks.
'6 1986 ECR at 2115.
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is simply inadequate. The ECJ cannot rely on "independent" assessors to neutrally weigh job characteristics in their valuation
processes.
2. Member State and ECJ reliance on stereotypes.
Member States have compounded the discriminatory standards problem by incorporating outdated and often anachronistic
stereotypes of women's physical abilities and limitations into their
judicial and legislative judgments. In Germany, for example, although the Basic Law of 1949 provides that "men and women have
equal rights," courts have allowed employers to pay women less
when such a practice arises out of "natural" differences between
men and women."7 German national courts have thus refused to
critically assess the actual effect these biological differences have
on a woman's ability to perform in the work place. Instead, the
German courts have been content to rest their judgments on outdated stereotypes, and they have not hesitated to uphold legisla58
tive judgments that rest upon similar bases.
The ECJ has also contributed to the problems in this area by
permitting employers to justify discriminatory practices on the basis of outdated, and often groundless, stereotypes. For example,
the ECJ recently ruled that in the selection of head wardens,
recruiting practices that discriminate against women do not run
afoul of the ETD. 9 In this case, the plaintiff challenged the practice of selecting head wardens from a pool of candidates-those
presently employed as wardens-that rarely contained women.
However, the Court did not question the state's assertion that sex
is properly considered in determining eligibility for employment as
a warden in the first instance. It simply assumed that one's gender
Thus, employers may point to "natural" differences-such as menstruation, pregnancy, childbirth, and lack of physical strength-to justify paying women less. See Ruth
Harvey, Equal Treatment of Men and Women in the Work Place: The Implementation of
the European Community's Equal Treatment Legislation in the Federal Republic of Germany, 38 Amer J of Comp L 31, 41 (1990).
' For example, German courts have consistently upheld legislation that forbids women
blue collar workers, on the grounds of biological difference, from working at night. They
have upheld such legislation despite the fact that it does not apply to white collar workers,
and despite the fact that it does not apply to women employed in hospitals, restaurants, and
cultural establishments-all industries employing a high percentage of women. Thus, such

legislation does not protect female blue collar workers equally. Instead, it is more likely to
exclude them from higher paying factory work altogether. See Judgment of 17 Dec 1980, 35
NJW 66 (1982), cited in Harvey, 38 Amer J Comp L at 42-43 (cited in note 57).
'9 However, the ECJ did hold that such recruiting practices for policemen would violate
the ETD. Case 318/86, Re Sex Discriminationin the Civil Service: Commission v France,

1988 ECR 3559, 1989:3 CMLR 663.
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affects one's ability to discharge a warden's custodial duties." That
such a questionable and uninformed assertion could form the basis
of the ECJ's opinion suggests that cultural and social stereotypes
may also impair the court's judgment.
Yet, according judicial notice to biological difference may
sometimes benefit women. Indeed, women may occasionally require state intervention in order to achieve true equality: pregnant
women may need State protection to prevent employers from discriminating against them. Unfortunately, Member States have
often failed to enact such beneficial legislation, or they have enacted overbroad legislation that may actually harm women.
For example, British law prohibits employee dismissal based
on pregnancy or reasons connected with pregnancy.6 1 The law allows employers to dismiss pregnant workers, however, if the pregnancy incapacitates the employee or if work conditions pose a risk
to the woman's or her unborn child's health. While this appears
quite reasonable in theory, in practice, neither British courts nor
legislators have carefully scrutinized women's abilities to work during pregnancy. Unlike their American counterparts, which require
employers to show by objective evidence that women must be excluded because there is no acceptable alternative,62 British courts
only require employers to show that the job cannot reasonably be
reorganized to minimize reproductive hazards. Again, discredited
stereotypes undermine the effectiveness of measures designed to
enhance workplace equality.
Unfortunately, the ECJ has also evinced its unwillingness to critically examine such
stereotypical assumptions in other contexts. For example, in Johnston v Chief Constable, an
Irish police officer complained that a discriminatory policy forced her to take a low paying,
part-time reassignment. Case 222/84, 1986 ECR 1651, 1986:3 CMLR 240. This reassignment
was prompted by a policy change that required police officers to carry firearms as a result of
a surge in police assassinations in Northern Ireland. However, the new policy declared that
women should not be allowed to carry firearms, because armed women were more likely to
become targets for assassination and were less likely to effectively discharge the duties to
which they had traditionally been assighed-namely, social work requiring contact with
families and children.
Although the ECJ held that women could not be excluded from a certain type of work
merely "on the ground that public opinion demands that women be given greater protection
than men against risks which affect men and women in the same way," it also ruled that
where carrying firearms might create additional risks, Member States could consider the sex
of the police officer in apportioning such risks among public employees. 1986 ECR at 168789. Thus, when the "derogations remain within the limits of what is appropriate and necessary for achieving the aim in view[,]" they may be upheld. Id at 1687. This vague test thus
lacks the bite needed to effectively enforce equal pay guarantees.
" Employment Protection (Consolidation) Act of 1978, § 60, cited in O'Donovan &
Szyszczak, Equality and Sex DiscriminationLaw at 178 n 97 (cited in note 5).
" See Griggs, 401 US at 424.
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3. Attitudinal barriers to change.
Finally, and perhaps most insidiously, women are hindered in
their quest for equality by societal attitudes that inform both the
way men view women, and, more importantly, the way women view
themselves. For example, in the EC, unemployment is higher for
women than for men, despite the fact that two-thirds of women
desire and seek paid employment." Both men and women, however, still believe that men are more entitled to employment than
women. 64 As long as attitudes like these persist, women will find it
difficult to gain equal pay and equal employment.
C. Inadequate Penalties and Remedies
To date, very few equal pay cases have been brought before
national tribunals.2 In part, heavy burdens of proof and discriminatory standards, such as those discussed above, may have discouraged women from seeking legal vindication of their rights. An
equally significant detriment, however, has been the inadequate
remedies Member States have made available to successful plaintiffs. For example, until recently, German plaintiffs were entitled
to recover only the costs that they incurred in mailing their job
applications or the costs that they incurred in traveling to job interviews.6 6 They could not obtain either injunctive or normal mon7
6
etary relief.

Fortunately, the ECJ has held that such clearly inadequate remedial provisions violate Community law. Although Member
States are free to enact whatever kinds of private remedies they
see fit to ensure compliance with Community legislation, the reme63

Women and Men of Europe in 1983 80 (Commission of the European Community,

1983).
For example, when asked whether they agreed with the statement, "Some say that in
a period of high unemployment a man has a greater right to work than a woman," about 60
percent of both men and women answered that they either "agreed completely" or "somewhat" with this statement. Id at 96.
6 For instance, in 1976, the year the Equal Pay Act was passed in the U.K., women
brought 1,742 applications. By 1983, that number had fallen to 26. O'Donovan & Szyszczak,
Equality and Sex Discrimination at 215 (cited in note 5).
6 Harvey, 38 Amer J Comp L at 56 (cited in note 57).
67 Since most pay discrimination occurs in segregated occupations, women may need
injunctive relief to force employers to desegregate such occupations. Yet, currently, the ECJ
seems reluctant to wield its authority to dispense such relief. Thus, in Von Colson and
Kamann v Land Nordrhein-Westfalen, the ECJ held that the equality directives do not
require Member States to make available any particular kind of private remedy. Hence,
Member States retain sufficient discretion to exclude injunctive relief from the list of private remedies that they make available to victims of discrimination. Case 14/83, 1984 ECR
1891, 1907, 1986:1 CMLR 430.
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dies enacted must, at a minimum, adequately compensate victims
and effectively deter future violations. 8 However, many Member
States' remedies remain at or below this minimally adequate level.
III.

PROPOSED REFORMS

In order to protect free competition among Member States,
both direct and indirect pay and employment discrimination must
be eliminated. Towards that end, the Community must make it
easier for claimants to raise, pursue, and recover on their Article
119 claims. Some relatively simple measures would suffice.
A.

Removing Impediments to Judicial Vindication of Rights

In order to encourage victims of discrimination to judicially
vindicate their rights, the Community must establish a broader
definition of comparators. Such a definition should allow both
cross-industry and cross-national comparisons, as this may be the
only effective way to force employers to desegregate certain occupations. Further, the Community should force Member States to
allocate burdens of proof more equitably and liberalize discovery
rules. This would make it both easier and cheaper for plaintiffs to
pursue their discrimination claims. Moreover, the Community,
building upon the standards enunciated in Bilka, should expressly
limit and closely scrutinize the defenses available to employers.6 9
The ECJ should thus hold employers to a strict standard of
necessity.
B.

Identifying and Revising Discriminatory Standards

The ECJ should also carefully review Member State valuation
systems to ensure that the factors considered are not weighted in a
discriminatory manner. In order to overcome demonstrated Mem" See id, 1984 ECR at 1908.

"' In fact, the Commission has considered and approved of many of these measures in a
preparatory action. See Proposal for a Council Directive on the Burden of Proof in The
Area of Equal Pay and Equal Treatment for Women and Men, 1988 OJ C176:5. Although it
lacks binding effect, this proposed directive would address many of the equal pay problems
women face, and thus it should be implemented as a directive. For example, article 3 of the
proposed directive would place the burden of proof on an employer once a plaintiff has
shown "a fact or a series of facts which would, if not rebutted, amount to direct or indirect
discrimination." Further, article 4 of the proposed directive would require the employer to
disclose to women plaintiffs all relevant information reasonably obtainable. Noticeably absent from the proposed directive, however, is any attempt to define "comparators" for the
purposes of equal pay claims. Thus, it is by no means a complete solution to present equal
pay problems.
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ber State and judicial intransigence in this area, the ECJ must ensure that the Member States strictly observe their obligations
under the Equal Treatment and Equal Pay Directives. Towards
this end, the ECJ should place the burden of proof on employers
to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that their discriminatory pay
practices are essential and justified. °
Further, the ECJ should carefully review both Member State
laws and employer practices that are based on unproven stereotypes. It must force Member States to reevaluate paternalistic legislation, and it must hold employers to a high standard of proof
when they seek to base an exclusionary practice on a purported
concern for a woman's safety or health. 7 1 However, the ECJ should
also continue to distinguish between legislation that excludes
women from jobs on the basis of stereotypes and legislation that is
genuinely beneficial. Only the latter, equality-promoting legislation
should be upheld and encouraged.
Moreover, the EC must combat attitudinal impediments by
encouraging women to enter non-traditional professions. Towards
this end, the EC should offer special training programs, publicize
the nature and extent of the problem in order to educate Community citizens, and establish affirmative action programs in some
traditionally segregated industries. Such measures will assist equal
pay advocates in winning the hearts and minds of both employers
and employees.
C.

Bolstering Compensatory and Punitive Remedies

Only by revising EC law to make private remedies more adequate-both in terms of the relief granted to successful plaintiffs
and the penalties imposed on losing employers-will the above reforms work their intended effect. Private enforcement of rights

70

Here, the EC might learn from the United States' experience. Employers in the U.S.

are prohibited from discriminating on the basis of gender under Title VII of the 1964 Civil
Rights Act. See 42 USC §§ 2000e-2000e-17 (1988). The rules under Title VII are much more
stringent than those under European law, and they require employers to bear the burden of
proving, with scientific evidence, that excluding women from a particular occupation is absolutely necessary for health, safety, or other fundamental reasons. European courts simply
cannot accept employer assertions that women, because of their physical constitution, are
less able to perform certain duties. See O'Donovan & Szyszczak, Equality and Sex Discrimination Law at 199-200 (cited in note 5).
" The EC requires Member States to revise paternalistic laws when "the concern for
protection which originally inspired them is no longer well founded." Council Dir 76/207, art
3, 1976 OJ at L39:40 (cited in note 3). However, the ECJ presently lacks the means (and the
desire?) to determine when a Member State's paternalistic laws run afoul of the ETD.
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thus depends not only upon the availability of remedies, but also
upon their adequacy.
Member States should make presumed and punitive damages
available to victims of discrimination. Presumed damages would
relieve successful plaintiffs of the difficult burden of proving the
actual harm they suffered as a result of an employer's failure to
hire them." Such damages would, at the least, prevent courts from
following the German example of measuring damages solely in
terms of the actual costs incurred in applying for a job.
Moreover, punitive damages should be made available to victims of discrimination. Given limited state enforcement resources,
such awards are perhaps the most effective way to encourage employer compliance with equal pay and employment legislation.
Further, the prospect of recovering punitive damages would give
victims of discrimination added incentive to pursue their claims.7 3
D.

Towards a Comprehensive
Law

Community Antidiscrimination

The EC should be wary of granting Member States too much
discretion in crafting discrimination remedies. For example, if a
Member State makes available injunctive relief to victims of discrimination, then its women may have greater incentives to bring
suit against employers that discriminate. However, if other Member States do not allow injunctive relief, and overall have less adequate and effective discrimination remedies, then industries in
such countries may gain a competitive advantage over rivals located in countries with more extensive discrimination remedies.
Again, uneven exposure to legal liability across the Community will
place some Member States' industries at a competitive disadvantage in terms of labor costs. 74 Fair competition will therefore remain a distant Community goal until some measure of uniformity,
712

Such damages would be calculated by determining the monthly or yearly salary of-

fered for the position in question, and multiplying this amount by an appropriate term of
months or years. National legislatures would be responsible for determining the length of
time to be used in such calculations, and they might vary such lengths according to the
unique features of a particular industry or trade. However, the EC also may want to impose
some floors here so that Member States do not undermine these reforms by selecting unreasonably brief periods of time.
7' European discomfort with allowing plaintiffs to recover punitive damages-for fear
of a surge in frivolous litigation-might be somewhat allayed by requiring plaintiffs to donate a portion of any punitive recovery to a public trust established for the benefit of other
discrimination victims. Such a scheme could preserve the beneficial deterrent effects of punitive damages without strongly encouraging frivolous litigation.
7 See note 32 and accompanying text.
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with respect to the remedies made available to victims of pay and
employment discrimination, is introduced. Further Community
legislation remains the best way to achieve such uniformity.
CONCLUSION

Although the EC has attempted to guarantee pay and employment equality, it must enact the above reforms to make these
guarantees a reality. However, enacting such reforms may be difficult for several reasons-not the least of which is the fact that the
Community's authority to legislate is largely confined to matters of
trade and competition. Given the recent Community crisis, occasioned by Denmark's refusal to'ratify the Maastricht treaty, enlarging the Community's competence to deal with non-economic issues may not be politically feasible at this time. Yet, at the very
least, the above suggests that by focusing on competitive effects,
EC antidiscrimination legislation has not been as effective as it
might have been, especially in terms of combatting indirect discrimination. 75 The Community must broaden its focus if it is to
eliminate such discrimination. Only then will it possess the weapons that it needs to effectively combat discrimination in the workplace and beyond.

75 Segregation of occupations by gender is only the most obvious example of this. Because the economic effects of excluding women from certain jobs are felt only within an
industry, not in its relation to others, such practices have rarely been subjected to Community antidiscrimination laws.

